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Abstract
Eﬃcient authenticated group key establishment is the pre-requirement for having group-wide encrypted
communications in wireless ad hoc networks. Clustering has brought scalability to ad hoc networks in many
ways, now we look at its beneﬁts to group key agreement. In this paper, several solutions for authenticated
key establishment in clustered ad hoc networks are surveyed and a new eﬃcient solution for clustered group
key establishment is presented. It is based on the AT-GDH and the Burmester-Desmedt broadcast group
key protocols.
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1 Introduction
Constructing group wide keys in a large ad hoc network is a complicated task that
may be unachievable due to the dynamic nature of ad hoc networks. Splitting the
problem to pieces, clustering the network, is a usual solution suggested for routing
already in [12]. Clusters are supposed to have more stable internal connections
due to the greater amount of links between nodes in a same cluster. Therefore,
contributory group keys are easier to establish and manage inside clusters. On
the other hand, clusters are assumed to stay together longer than the nodes do in
average, which makes inter-cluster key agreement more sensible. Thus, clustering
may bring the necessary scalability into key establishment in very large networks.
In ad hoc networks, every pair of nodes cannot reach each other within one hop.
This issue of restricted topology, what H. Shi and M. He [18] call the neighbours
communication problem can be alleviated by a careful choice for the graph structure
that can be found in an arbitrary topology. A key agreement protocol using a
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spanning tree was presented by the author [9] and Di Crescenzo, et al., [4]. A
clustered hybrid protocol using the protocol in [9] in connection with the Burmester-
Desmedt key agreement (BD) [3], will be presented in this paper.
Rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the concepts of
clustering, along with (non-clustered) group key agreement, lists security require-
ments for a group key agreement and brieﬂy describes the circumstances of an ad
hoc network environment and their eﬀect to the task. Section 3 goes through some
related clustered group key establishment methods and Section 4 presents the new
clustered group key agreement protocol. Section 5 concludes the paper and sketches
some lines for future work.
2 Background
2.1 Clustering and Hierarchical routing
A cluster is a collection of nodes (geometrically) close together. Clusters can be
formed deliberately for a common cause or they can form as a reaction to a factor
that is common to the nodes.
A hierarchical structure in a network is composed of nested groupings (cluster-
ings) of nodes, forming a tree topology. Hierarchical structures are often used in
routing see, e.g., [12], where optimal clustering structures are determined so as to
minimise the size of the routing tables. Many algorithms need the knowledge of the
whole network topology, while others perform the computations knowing only the
neighbouring nodes and their possible cluster-memberships [1,21].
Clustering algorithms diﬀer in what types of clusters they produce. Many clus-
tering algorithms choose special nodes, cluster-heads, that take care of the cluster
formation and later of the maintenance of the cluster [1], sometimes routing too.
Cluster-heads are not always necessary, some clustering protocols do not use them
at all. Gateways are border nodes that relay messages from one cluster to another.
If clusters are allowed to overlap, a gateway usually belongs to more than one clus-
ter. Some clustering algorithms form cliques, i.e., clusters where every node is at a
one hop distance from every other node [13].
More information on clusterings can be found, for example, in [19].
2.2 Group Key Agreement
The purpose of key establishment is to create a common key for a group of two or
more participants to be used for encryption and authentication of their communi-
cations. For two participants, the Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange [6] is often the most
convenient choice. The multi-party case requires a generalisation of a two-way key
exchange.
There are distributory and contributory group key protocols. A contributory
protocol means that all participants take part in the key generation and guarantee
for their part that the resulting key is fresh. Key distribution, on the other hand,
means that the key is generated by one party and distributed to the other partici-
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pants. This cannot be done without the help of a previously agreed-on secret that
is used in encrypting the new session key. There is also a method called key pre-
distribution, whereby the key is completely determined by the previously agreed-on
initial key material.
2.3 Security Requirements for Group Key Establishment
In the context of group key exchange, implicit key authentication means that a
participant can be sure that no-one outside the group can learn the key without
the help of a dishonest participant. Key conﬁrmation means that after the key
has been established, the participants are assured that all legitimate participants
do share the same key. As this would require many all-to-all messages, which
may not even be possible in a sparse connection ad hoc network, achieving key
conﬁrmation is not practical. Explicit Key Authentication means that both implicit
key authentication and key conﬁrmation hold, i.e., all participants are assured that
all legitimate participants know the key and no outsiders do.
An active adversary should not be able to mislead honest participants as to
the ﬁnal outcome. A compromise of past session keys should not allow a passive
adversary to ﬁnd out future session keys and should not allow impersonation by an
active adversary in the future. Independence of long term and short term secrets is
important when there is an additional long term secret present, for example, private
keys of a public-key algorithm or passwords used in authentication.
2.4 The Challenges of Group Key Establishment inAd Hoc Network Environment
The limitations of ad hoc network environment pose some drastic demands on the
group key establishment protocols. First, a global broadcast is most probably out
of the question, that is, it is not probable that an arbitrary node will have direct
connections to all other participant nodes. But on some occasions, a local broadcast
from a node to its neighbours is feasible. Also, no ﬁxed topology, such as a ring or
a star can be assumed. Consequently, protocols requiring a speciﬁc topology either
cannot be used at all or become ineﬃcient.
In other words, every pair of nodes cannot reach each other within one hop.
The issue, what H. Shi and M. He call the neighbours communication problem can
be solved with the help of graph theory. This paper makes use of a spanning-tree
algorithm, see [9] and [4]. There are also algorithms for generating more balanced
spanning trees. See, for example, a survey by Ga¨rtner [7].
The lack of infrastructure means that there are initially no third parties that can
be trusted to calculate a random key safely and to distribute it. A lack of common
history implies the lack of previously agreed shared secrets.
2.5 Group Key Agreement Protocols
For the deﬁnitions of trees and other graph theoretic notions, see, for example, [5].
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The BD Broadcast Protocol
The broadcast protocol [3] assumes that every node is at a one hop distance
from another. The protocol is accomplished with only two broadcasts per node.
BD Protocol Steps:
G is a ﬁnite cyclic group and g is a generator of G.
(i) Each node mi selects a random exponent ri and broadcasts zi = g
ri
(ii) Each node mi computes and broadcasts xi = (zi+1/zi−11)
ri
(iii) Each node computes the session key ki = z
nri
i−1x
n−1
i x
n−2
i+1 · · · xi+n−2.
TGDH
Tree-based Group Diﬃe-Hellman (TGDH) [11] employs Diﬃe-Hellman key ex-
changes in binary key trees. The described key structure results from the dynamic
group key operations such as join, leave, merge and partition. There is no initial
key agreement protocol.
The key structure in TGDH is very general, it can be used to describe the key
structure of any bipartite group Diﬃe-Hellman key agreement where the resulting
keys are used recursively as the new exponents. For example, the key structure
of the protocol Hypercube [2] is the same as that of TGDH with perfect binary
tree where all leaves are at the bottom level. Paper [14] extends TGDH protocol
to improve the computational eﬃciency by utilising pairing-based cryptography.
They use bilinear pairings in a ternary key tree which applies to any two-party and
three-party key agreement protocol.
AT-GDH
AT-GDH (Arbitrary Topology Generalisation of Diﬃe-Hellman) [9] employs a
spanning tree. A spanning tree contains only the (one hop) links used in initial
key agreement. This avoids the neighbours communication problem, as the Diﬃe-
Hellman key exchanges are done only with one-hop neighbours. The operations
propagate over the network along the spanning tree. AT-GDH can be used in any
connected network topology with bidirectional links, because a spanning tree can
always be constructed in such a network.
All leaf nodes (nodes with no children) start by selecting a random secret expo-
nent and blind it and send the result to their respective parents. After a node has
received the blinded keys from all its children, they select their exponents and form
Diﬃe-Hellman-type keys with their children repeatedly using the resulting key as
the new exponent. The nodes do not send these keys to the children yet. The se-
cret formed with the last child serves as the node’s new private key, which the node
blinds and sends to its parent. When this parent has received similar messages from
all its children, it can repeat the same computation. This continues until the root
has received all the blinded keys of its children. The root repeats the same kind of
computation as all the other parent nodes. The secret key formed thus between the
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root and its last child (and all other nodes) will be the shared session key material
for the entire network. In the last phase of the protocol, the blinded keys needed
for extracting the group key are propagated up the tree from the parents to their
children starting from the root.
Key Agreement Protocol for an Arbitrary Tree:
Initialisation:
Let G be a ﬁnite cyclic group of order q, and let α be a generator of G.
The participants are assumed to pick their secret exponents randomly from
Zq. The mapping ϕ : G −→ Zq is a bijection (always exists). Here the
participants are identiﬁed with their universal address in the tree. cx is the
number of x’s children. h is the height of the tree.
Round 1
For all nodes x = y.i with cx = 0
(i) x selects a random kx ∈ Zq
(ii) x → y : αkx
Rounds 2 . . . h
For all nodes x with cx = 0
(i) x selects a random ex ∈ G
(ii) x waits to receive αkx.j for all j = 1, . . . , cx
(iii) x calculates kx = ϕ(K(x, cx)) from
K(x, 0) = ex
K(x, j) = αkx.jϕ(K(x,j−1)) for j = 1, . . . , cx
(iv) x → y : αkx
Rounds h + l, l = 1, . . . , h
For every node x.i on level l,
x → x.i: Mx.i, where
Mx.i = 〈Mx, αϕ(K(x,i−1)), αkx.(i+1) , αkx.(i+2) , αkx.cx 〉
with M being empty.
The resulting common key is K(, c) = k
AT-GDH does not contain group key management mechanisms, or authenticate
the resulting key explicitly. The number of synchronous rounds AT-GDH needs to
gather and distribute the blinded keys is twice the height of the tree. The height
of the tree is assumed to be logarithmic to the number of nodes in the network, de-
pending on the spanning tree algorithm and the topology of the underlying network
links.
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Other Protocols
Di Crescenzo, et al., [4] approach the problem of arbitrary topology from another
angle than AT-GDH. They rigorously analyse the eﬀect of physical topology on
the actual performance of some key agreement protocols. These include GDH.2
and the BD broadcast protocol. In their analysis, they apply a topology-driven
simulation of the logical network over any arbitrary ad hoc network graph. In
connection with the key agreement protocols, they use auxiliary protocols in order
to generate eﬃcient embeddings of logical networks over arbitrary ad hoc networks.
The auxiliary protocol suggested for generating a spanning tree is the same as in [9]
and is explained in the Appendix.
3 Related Group Key Establishment Schemes for Clus-
tered Ad Hoc Networks
A generic model for key establishment in clustered ad hoc networks works along
these lines: First, nodes form clusters with some clustering method. Then a back-
bone or a key-tree is formed from the clusters, sometimes the tree extends inside
clusters, sometimes the clusters are considered as single vertex in the tree. After this,
the initial key agreement begins. Usually keys are established in subgraphs ﬁrst,
and then combined for a whole group wide key. The Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange
(bipartite or tripartite) is typically used recursively as a basis for the group keying.
A group key is constructed so that every node can calculate it using its own secret
and the blinded secrets of others, or combinations of them. In some scenarios
the messages are signed and key conﬁrmation messages are sent for authentication
purposes.
Rhee, et al., [17] present an architecture for key management in hierarchical
mobile ad hoc networks. They use implicitly certiﬁed public keys (ICPK) [8], an
ID-based public key scheme where the public key of each participant is derived
from its identity. It provides computationally eﬃcient implicit authentication. A
key conﬁrmation message added to the key agreement protocol makes the proto-
col explicitly authenticated. A two layered hierarchy is prompted by a physically
two-layered network, ground nodes and unmanned aerial vehicles. The layers use
diﬀerent key management methods, the clusters of nodes below use a centralised
system, while the aerial vehicles use TGDH. The centralised system inside clusters
is not contributory.
Another hierarchical key agreement is proposed in [22]. This is a multilevel
hierarchy, where a node can have several cluster keys according to the cluster and
its super-clusters it belongs to. However, it is not completely contributory. Keys
are agreed among cluster-heads on the same level and then distributed to their
respective clusters.
Hybrid key management [15] propose a clustered key establishment, where each
cluster selects a cluster-head that makes a key agreement with other cluster-heads.
After that, the cluster-head distributes the key to the cluster. Thus, other nodes
in the cluster do not contribute to the key. Clustering is made according to the
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Fig. 1. Clustered AT-GDH
geometric locations of the nodes. The key agreement used can be any group key
agreement protocol, for example GDH [20].
A cluster-tree-based group key agreement ACEKA is presented in [18]. ACEKA
uses ternary trees with the Joux tripartite Diﬃe-Hellman key agreement [10]. There
is a virtual backbone and virtual nodes in addition to the real nodes. ACEKA uses
cluster-heads and “sponsors” for management. Authentication is done by signing
every message using ID-based cryptography, with a variant of the ElGamal signature
scheme.
4 The Proposed Group Key Protocol: Clustered AT-
GDH
First, the network is divided into clusters with a clustering mechanism that creates
very stable clusters. Nodes in a cluster are at a one hop distance from each other, i.e.,
cliques. In this kind of a cluster, the most eﬃcient group key agreement protocol is
the BD broadcast protocol explained before. It takes only two rounds of broadcasts,
after which each node can calculate the common group key from its own secret
exponent and the blinded shares of others.
When every cluster has a common secret key, the clusters agree a group key by
AT-GDH protocol. Cluster-head can represent its cluster and use the cluster key
as its secret exponent, instead of selecting a random kx ∈ Zq in Round 1. (see the
box in Subsection 2.5). After the AT-GDH protocol run, cluster-heads distribute
(broadcast) the last received message in their cluster, so that other nodes can also
calculate the network wide group key. Figure 1 shows an example structure of the
resulting cluster-tree.
Now that cluster-heads are not necessarily at a one hop distance from each
other, the messages need to be relayed. The gateways relaying the messages are
members of a cluster, and know the cluster secret already. However, it aﬀects the
communication complexity by adding extra links to the path.
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4.1 Complexity Theoretic Analysis of Performance
This clustered group key agreement is eﬃcient when cliques are large. Radio con-
nections may create relatively large cliques. We evaluate the complexity in respect
to synchronous rounds and number of exponentiations. A synchronous round means
that every participant can send arbitrarily many packages concurrently within a sin-
gle time tick (round) or receive arbitrarily many at the beginning of a round. The
number of exponentiations means the total number (the sum) of exponentiations
performed by all participants.
Every clique forms a group key in two communication rounds, i.e., constant
amount of rounds. In the end, cluster-heads broadcast the key parts in one commu-
nication round. The complexity of a clustered key agreement is the complexity of
AT-GDH in the number of clusters plus a constant. The resulting communication
complexity is logarithmic to the number of clusters c.
The number of exponentiations can be estimated in the same way, using the
ﬁgures for BD and AT-GDH. The amount of exponentiations in BD is n2+n = O(n2)
and AT-GDH (with cluster-heads) O(c log c). In the end, the exponentiations done
after the ﬁnal broadcast by a single node is the amount of clusters, in the worst case,
and all leave nodes (≤ n) do a total of O(nc) exponentiations. The total number of
exponentiations is O(n2) +O(c log c).
BD GDH.2 AT-GDH Clustered AT-GDH
syn. rounds 2 n 2log n	 3 + 2log c	
total exp. n2 + n O(n2) O(n log n) O(n2) +O(c log c)
Table 1
The eﬃciency measures for some key agreement protocols
The above analysis is done without considering the cost of embedding the pro-
tocol in an arbitrary ad hoc network topology. Thus, each protocol is evaluated in
its optimal network topology. However, AT-GDH requires as its embedding only a
protocol for generating a spanning tree, which can be done rather eﬃciently. The
protocol described in [9] adds only h communication rounds, h equalling the height
of the tree, i.e., the eccentricity of the initiating node.
In this case, the assumption of a balanced spanning tree that has a logarithmic
communication complexity may be too optimistic. Using the Unit Disk Graph
model and assuming a dense evenly distributed network we can approximate the
height of the resulting spanning tree in another way. In the unit disk model, the
nodes have same transmission radii, one unit. If the node density is δ, the average
number of neighbours is the number of nodes in a unit disk δπ. The average distance
between neighbouring nodes is d = 1/
√
2. In a dense network, the number of nodes
within k hops, nk can be estimated by counting the area of a disk with a radius
kd. Then, nk = (kd)
2πδ. The maximum path length from the root to the leave is
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then k = 1
d
√
n
πδ
=
√
2n
πδ
. Hence, k grows to the square root of n and the resulting
complexity for clustered AT-GDH is the square root to the number of clusters.
4.2 Adding Authentication
Previously group key agreements, like the authenticated GDH, A-GDH, relied
much on the implicit key authentication property: The group key can not be con-
structed without the secret share of one of the participants. However, Pereira and
Quisquater [16] showed that it is impossible to design a scalable authenticated group
key agreement protocol on the same building blocks as A-GDH. Hence other au-
thentication methods are needed. Authentication with ID-based crypto, such as the
ICPK [8] public keys, with key conﬁrmation messages, could be used here, as it is
independent of the group key establishment method used.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Clustering is a versatile solution in ad hoc networks, its beneﬁts can be seen in
routing and other operations requiring eﬃcient gathering and propagation of in-
formation among the network. It was seen here that clustering can also help in
creating a symmetric group key for fast encrypted communications. A new group
key protocol was proposed. The cluster-based extension of AT-GDH combined to
the broadcast group key protocol turned out to be very eﬃcient. Using UDG:s, the
number of rounds was found to be comparable to the square root of the number of
clusters.
Clustered AT-GDH could be more eﬃcient with tripartite key exchange realized
with bilinear pairings as in [14]. Manipulating the form of the tree and clusters may
also aﬀect the eﬃciency of the group key establishment. However this needs more
research. A security proof of the new combined protocol is also left for future work.
In an ad hoc network where nodes are mobile, a mere group key establishment
is not always enough. The group key needs maintenance. At least the key should
be updated when nodes join or leave the network, to preserve its contributory
property. Neither AT-GDH nor the clustered extension proposed here have group
key maintenance which is outside the scope of this paper and left for future work.
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A Appendix: Constructing a Spanning Tree
This way to construct a spanning tree so that the node initiating the protocol
becomes the root was described in [9].
In the initial state it is assumed that the nodes know their neighbours and that
all links are two-way. The initiator sends a message to each of its neighbours.
It thereby becomes the root of the spanning tree and its neighbours become its
children. After receiving a message, a node acknowledges it and sends a similar
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message to all its neighbours, except to the parent. The nodes that acknowledge
a message from a node become its children in the tree. When a node gets more
than one of these messages, it acknowledges and processes only the message that it
receives ﬁrst, and consequent messages are ignored. This continues until every node
has received a message. A leaf is a node that does not receive acknowledgements
from any of its neighbours. The spanning tree has now been constructed and all
nodes know their parent and their children.
This spanning-tree protocol can be used in a network where the connections are
reliable. In an unreliable network, negative acknowledgements must be sent for the
messages that are ignored. Local broadcast can be used to send the message to all
neighbours and an acknowledgement to the parent all in one message.
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